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Clo se to  the lo tus -filled expanse o f Shino bazu Po nd in To kyo ’s  Ueno  Park, a narro w back s treet leads  into  a driveway that curves
between mo ssy walls  to  the to p o f a small hill. At the summit s tands  an impo s ing mans io n who se neo -Jaco bean facade, fro nted by
tall palm trees , wo uld lo o k mo re at ho me in the s treets  o f a nineteenth century Euro pean spa to wn than in the mids t o f twenty-firs t
century To kyo .
This  building was  des igned by the British architect Jo s iah Co nder in
the 1890s , and was  fo r many years  the ho me o f the Iwasaki family,
who  fo unded and o wned the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu. Still kno wn as  the
Fo rmer Iwasaki Res idence [Kyu-Iwasaki Tei], it is  no w o pen to  the
public. Its  ro o ms, refurbished in the s tyle o f the late Meiji Era, are
ado rned with info rmatio n bo ards  which give ins ights  into  the
his to rical trans fo rmatio ns  thro ugh which this  mans io n has  passed
o ver the pas t century o r mo re. But there is  a s trange s ilence
surro unding o ne o f the mo s t fascinating and dis turbing episo des  in
the building’s  his to ry - its  ro le in the US o ccupatio n o f Japan.
During the o ccupatio n, a vis ito r to  the Fo rmer Iwasaki Res idence
wo uld have been co nfro nted by a large barred gate bearing a s ign
which s tated that the building was  no w being used by the Anglican
Church in Japan.1 This  was  partly true. The tatami-flo o red Japanese-
s tyle wing which lies  to  the right o f the main entrance was  indeed
o ccupied by o ffices  o f the Anglican Church engaged in vario us  so cial
welfare activities . But fro m 1947 to  the end o f the o ccupatio n, the
main wes tern-s tyle wing o f the mans io n was  ho me to  a very different
ins titutio n, kno wn as  Z Unit o r the Cano n Organizatio n [Kyanon
Kikan], after its  leader – the taciturn, gun-lo ving Texan, Jo seph [Jack]
Yo ung Cano n (1914-1981).2 The Iwasaki mans io n, which the
Occupatio n fo rces  called “Ho ngo  Ho use”, was  bo th the headquarters  o f Z Unit and the hub o f a netwo rk o f clandes tine “safe
ho uses” co ntro lled by the Unit thro ugho ut To kyo  and surro unding areas , and as  far afield as  Okinawa and po ss ibly beyo nd.
Fo r mo s t o f its  life, Z Unit o perated under the co mmand o f the US o ccupatio n fo rces ’ intelligence arm, G2, and its  co re activities
included espio nage, co unter espio nage, smuggling, and “special renditio ns ” (as  they are no w called): the illegal abductio n and
interro gatio n o f Japanese, Ko reans  and o thers , who  were so metimes  incarcerated in the cellars  underneath the Fo rmer Iwasaki
Res idence. Itagaki Kō zō , a yo ung Japanese man who  had the mis fo rtune to  attract Z Unit’s  attentio ns , tes tif ied that he had been
subjected to  to rture in the building’s  detentio n cells , and to  a mo ck executio n carried o ut at dead o f night amo ngs t the ro lling lawns
and s to ne lanterns  o f the mans io n’s  garden.3 Z Unit’s  mo s t famo us  victim, the left-wing Japanese no velis t Kaji Wataru (1903-1982),
who  was  kidnapped in No vember 1951 and held by the Unit fo r o ver a year, also  s tated that he had been interro gated and to rtured in
the Iwasaki Mans io n’s  dungeo ns .4
By the s tandards  o f secret intelligence o rganizatio ns , Z Unit was  no t particularly go o d at keeping secrets . Its  activities  became the
subject o f widespread media speculatio n immediately after the end o f the o ccupatio n era, and have co ntinued to  attract curio s ity
and co ntro versy ever s ince. Many Japanese magaz ines  have published articles  abo ut the underco ver activities  o f the Unit, ranging
fro m the reaso nably accurate to  the highly fanciful. Further info rmatio n co mes  fro m the memo irs  o f tho se who  came into  direct
co ntact with Z Unit, including two  Ko rean emplo yees: Wi Hye-yim (also  kno wn as  Han To -bo ng) and Yeo n Jeo ng, who  was  appo inted
to  the Unit by So uth Ko rean Pres ident Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee), and served as  Cano n’s  deputy (tho ugh Yeo n’s  tes timo ny in
particular needs  to  be used with cautio n).5 Yamada Zenjirō , a Japanese co o k emplo yed by Cano n and his  o rganizatio n, became a key
whis tleblo wer, helping to  expo se the Unit’s  activities  to  public s crutiny fo r the firs t time.6  With the suppo rt o f so cialis t po liticians
including Ino mata Kō zō  (1894-1993), Yamada’s  actio ns  resulted in Japanese parliamentary hearings  o n Z Unit in 1953, and the
s tatements  given to  tho se hearings , alo ng with later writings  by Yamada, Kaji and Ino mata shed further impo rtant light o n this
his to ry.7
In the pas t two  decades , the gradual declass ificatio n o f crucial US do cuments  has  led to  the publicatio n o f a number o f new
scho larly s tudies  re-examining aspects  o f the activities  o f Z Unit.8  US scho lar Erik Essels tro m has  secured the release o f
s ignificant material o n the Kaji affair.9  Impo rtant info rmatio n o n secret intelligence o peratio ns  in Japan has  also  co me to  light in
the tho usands  o f pages  o f CIA and o ther material declass ified in respo nse to  the Naz i War Crimes  Dis clo sure Act o f 1998  and the
Japanese Imperial Go vernment Dis clo sure Act o f 2000 , which required US agencies  to  release much o f the material they held o n war
crimes  co mmitted by Naz i Germany and its  allies , and o n po s twar co nnectio ns  between US o fficials  and suspected war criminals .10
Altho ugh very little o f this  material relates  directly to  Z Unit, it gives  fascinating ins ights  into  the co mplex enviro nment in which the
Unit o perated: a web o f interactio ns  between the clandes tine po s twar activities  o f Japanese fo rmer military figures  and the wo rk o f
US intelligence agencies  in Japan. The CIA do cuments  have recently been analysed and dis cussed by Japanese scho lars  Arima Tetsuo
and Yo shida No riaki, and the firs t part o f this  essay in particular builds  o n their wo rk, while also  us ing the new archive o f data to
po se ques tio ns  abo ut pro cesses  o f demo cratizatio n and the transbo rder dimens io ns  o f Japan’s  po s twar his to ry.11
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The gro wing mass  o f declass ified do cuments  sho ws  that there is  a go o d deal mo re to  be said, no t o nly abo ut Z Unit, but also , mo re
generally, abo ut the Co ld War intelligence gathering netwo rk in Eas t As ia and its  po litical ramificatio ns . We are s till, I think, far fro m
co mpleting the reassessment o f o ccupatio n era Japan that this  new archive demands . The declass ified do cuments  make vis ible the
transbo rder dimens io ns  o f o ccupatio n era clandes tine o peratio ns . Writings  o n Z Unit tend to  co ns ider its  his to ry abo ve all within
the bo undaries  o f the po s twar Japanese natio n, fo cus ing o n is sues  like the no to rio us  Kaji Wataru kidnapping, o r o n debates  abo ut
the po ss ible invo lvement o f Z Unit in mys terio us  Japanese po litical incidents  such as  the Mitaka, Matsukawa and Shimo yama
Incidents  o f 1949 .12 These are all impo rtant to pics  and deserve further examinatio n; but the Unit and o ther o rganizatio ns  with which
it wo rked also  had impo rtant cro ss -bo rder dimens io ns , linking Japan to  Ko rea (No rth and So uth), China (Co mmunis t and
Natio nalis t), the So viet Unio n and even Indo china.13 These cro ss -bo rder links  played an impo rtant part in shaping the nature o f the
emerging Co ld War regime in Eas t As ia.
The dis cuss io n that fo llo ws  explo res  so me o f these dimens io ns  o f the intelligence netwo rk o f which Z Unit was  part, and tries  to
place them into  a framewo rk which may help us  to  reco ns ider the o ccupatio n o f Japan in its  Eas t As ian Co ld War co ntext. This
his to ry also  highlights  the impo rtance o f reco ns idering the relatio nship between the co vert and o vert faces  o f fo rmally demo cratic
po litical sys tems .
Theorizing Espionage
Secret intelligence gathering is  central to  the po litical, diplo matic and so cial pro cesses  o f the mo dern wo rld; but it has  been
surpris ingly little s tudied and theo rized. Except when examining reco gnized dictato rships  o r autho ritarian regimes , theo ris ts  o f
po litics  generally fo cus  their attentio n o n o ther areas , such as  electo ral pro cesses , po litical parties , vo ting patterns , o r the
relatio nship between the legis lature and executive. Security experts  and his to rians  o f internatio nal relatio ns  so metimes  venture
into  the landscape o f espio nage, but their wo rk has  created few general paradigms  fo r unders tanding the place o f secret intelligence
gathering and underco ver o peratio ns  in mo dern po litics , so ciety and culture. Often, research o n these to pics  is  left to  the writers  o f
po pular his to ries  o r mass-media po litical expo sés , who se wo rk in turn is  viewed askance by academics .
There are several reaso ns  fo r this  pro blem. Reliable info rmatio n o n secret services  is , by definitio n, usually diff icult to  o btain.
Academics  are unders tandably wary o f being caught up in co nspiracy theo ries  and po o rly do cumented speculatio n abo ut the dark
deeds  o f the secret services . But the reluctance o f s cho lars  to  bring the secret dimens io ns  o f the s tate (and o f quas i-s tate
agencies ) into  the picture leaves  large lacunae in o ur unders tanding o f mo dern po litics  and his to ry.
Michael Kaufman argues  that “all so cieties  have at leas t so me degree o f demo cracy at so me level o f so cial, eco no mic o r po litical
life”. So  “we mus t lo o k at the degree o f demo cracy o f any so ciety and no t assume, a prio ri, that a certain sys tem is , o r is  no t,
auto matically demo cratic”.14 By the same to ken, we can say that all so cieties  have at leas t so me degree o f autho ritarianism and
arbitrary po wer at so me level o f so cial, eco no mic and po litical life.15 Autho ritarianism and arbitrary po wer are particularly densely
co ncentrated in the area o f intelligence gathering and secret o peratio ns .
The wo rld o f espio nage and underco ver o peratio ns  is  the realm where the s tate – the maker o f laws  – deliberately breaks  its  o wn
laws  in the interes t o f self-preservatio n. In this  sense, it fo rms  part o f the realm that Carl Schmitt, and mo re recently Gio rgio
Agamben, have termed “the s tate o f exceptio n”, and that Susan Buck-Mo rss  calls  the “wild zo ne o f po wer” — the zo ne where po wer
is  abo ve the law.16  This  realm has  beco me a greater and mo re impo rtant part o f almo s t all po litical sys tems  o ver the pas t half
century. In an age o f info rmatio n, the po ssess io n and guarding o f secrets  is  mo re than ever crucial to  po litical po wer; and in a
glo balized age, the co mplexity o f multilayered cro ss -bo rder interactio ns  impels  the s tate to  develo p ever-mo re extens ive
info rmatio n gathering sys tems , to  guard agains t multiple challenges  to  its  autho rity emerging fro m wide range o f directio ns .17
Unders tanding po litical sys tems , then, is  less  a matter o f drawing catego rical lines  between “demo cratic” and “autho ritarian” s tates
than o f trying to  unders tand ho w the spectrum o f demo cratic and autho ritarian elements  is  dis tributed in different so cieties , and
ho w these elements  co mpete and intertwine with o ne ano ther. This  two -part essay explo res  so me o f these is sues  in the co ntext o f
early Co ld War Japan. I examine aspects  o f the interactio n between secret agencies  and the vis ible and ackno wledged wo rld o f
po litics , and also  to uch o n the relatio nship between clandes tine o rganizatio ns  and so me o ther public activities , such as
internatio nal trade. The aim is  no t, o f co urse, to  seek so me all-po werful secret “po wer behind the thro ne” that co ntro lled po s twar
Japanese po litical life in toto. The relatio nship between the public and the secret, the demo cratic and the undemo cratic, is  much mo re
co mplicated than that. By explo ring o ne relatively well-do cumented mo ment o f interactio n between the fo rces  o f demo cratizatio n
and the fo rces  o f the secret s tate, this  s tudy tries  to  shed light o n so me o f tho se co mplexities .
Democratization, Intelligence Gathering and Japan’s Transwar Regime
Metho ds  o f selecting legis latures  and cho o s ing leaders  differ greatly between demo cracies  and vario us  types  o f autho ritarian
so ciety; metho ds  o f co llecting secret info rmatio n do  no t. Techniques  o f espio nage and o ther underco ver o peratio ns  are in general
quite readily trans ferable between the so cieties  that we define as  autho ritarian and tho se that we define as  demo cratic. The s to ry o f
the demo cratizatio n o f po s twar Japan illus trates  this  po int well. The o ccupatio n autho rities , at leas t in the firs t years  after Japan’s
defeat, applied genuine zeal and energy to  refo rming the electo ral sys tem, liberaliz ing labo ur relatio ns  and demo cratiz ing educatio n
(while also  preserving the ro le o f the Japanese empero r in a mo dified fo rm). But, almo s t fro m day o ne, they ado pted and
inco rpo rated elements  fro m Japan’s  prewar and wartime intelligence gathering activities  into  their o wn sys tem. These elements
inevitably had a large impact o n the develo pment o f the Japanese po litical and so cial o rder lo ng after the fo rmal end o f the
o ccupatio n.
There was  no thing unusual abo ut this  rapid trans fer o f the intelligence activities  o f a defeated natio n to  the hands  o f the victo rs . As
we no w kno w, fo r example, an analo go us  trans fer was  taking place at the same time between certain wartime German intelligence
figures  and the US o ccupiers  in wes tern Germany. In the German case, the Gehlen Organizatio n – set up in 1946  under a fo rmer
Wehrmacht general who  had fallen o ut o f favo ur with Hitler because o f his  critical views  o n the co urse o f the war – co o perated
clo sely with US G2 and later with the CIA, while at the same time recruiting fo rmer Naz i intelligence o peratives  like Emil Augsburg to
its  campaign o f info rmatio n gathering agains t Eas tern Euro pean targets .18
In the Japanese co ntext, where s imilar fo rms  o f co o peratio n were very widespread, we might even speak (at leas t where intelligence
activities  are co ncerned) o f a “transwar regime”. The term “transwar” is  no w widely used in the s tudy o f vario us  aspects  o f Japanese
his to ry, including cultural life, so cial po licy and bureaucratic planning, to  describe his to rical currents  that transcended the
co nventio nal divide between “pre” and “po s t” war.19  One o f the s lo gans  widely used by Japan’s  current prime minis ter, Abe Shinzō ,
has  been the phrase “escaping fro m the po s twar regime” – a phrase which encapsulates  the des ire o f Abe and his  po litical allies  to
ro ll back o ccupatio n era demo cratizatio n measures  which they see as  having been impo sed o n Japan by fo reigners . By ins tead us ing
the term “transwar regime”, I want to  turn attentio n to  impo rtant elements  o f the prewar and wartime sys tem that were deliberately
revived and develo ped during the o ccupatio n and thereafter, and to  examine their intimate relatio nship with the vis ible and o fficial
face o f po s twar Japanese demo cracy.
Charles A. Willo ughby
To  use this  term is  no t, o f co urse, to  sugges t that o ccupatio n refo rms  were mere windo w-dress ing. During the years  that
immediately fo llo wed Japan’s  defeat in war, the po litical sys tem was  trans fo rmed in pro fo und ways , and wide spaces  o f demo cracy
were o pened. But the co nscio us  preservatio n o f relatively unchanged elements  alo ngs ide, and interacting with, tho se spaces  o f
demo cracy makes  Japan a particularly fascinating case s tudy fo r co ns idering ho w co nfiguratio ns  o f demo cracy and autho ritarianism
shift and evo lve within a s ingle so ciety.
A fo cus  o n intelligence gathering challenges  us  to  reco ns ider the bo undary between “wartime” and “po s twar” regimes; it also
enco urages  us  to  rethink the geo graphical bo undaries  o f Japan’s  o ccupatio n perio d po litical his to ry. Secret s tate agencies  embo dy
two  central parado xes . Firs t, as  we have seen, the s tate – as  law-maker and law-giver – creates  agencies  which it autho rizes  to  break
its  o wn laws  in the interes ts  o f preserving the s tate itself. Seco nd, secret s tate agencies  exis t abo ve all to  pro tect the survival and
integrity o f the natio n s tate, but are at the same time inherently cro ss -bo rder, multinatio nal and multicultural. In espio nage and
o ther co vert o peratio ns , s tates  emplo y large numbers  o f fo reigners , o ften fro m “enemy” natio ns . They co nduct clandes tine
miss io ns  acro ss  bo rders , and engage in co mplex and o ften two -directio nal relatio ns  o f info rmatio n exchange with o uts iders .
Underco ver o peratio ns  in o ccupied Japan invo lved no t o nly the breaking o f laws  impo sed o n the o ccupied by the demo cratiz ing
o ccupiers , but also  multidirectio nal and o ften illegal bo rder cro ss ings . Gro ups  like Z Unit mo bilized multinatio nal gro ups  o f
Americans  (including many Japanese-Americans), Japanese, Chinese, Ko reans , Russ ians  and o thers  o n Japanese so il. They therefo re
became, no t s imply a co mplicating element in the creatio n o f po s twar Japanese demo cracy, but also  a fo rce that helped to  shape
the Co ld War Eas t As ian o rder as  a who le.
Generic to the Field: Factionalism, Rivalry and Espionage in Occupation-Era Japan
In early 1951, as  the CIA co nso lidated its  po wer in Japan, a senio r Agency o fficial pro duced a subs tantial repo rt o n Japan’s
intelligence services  pas t, present and future. The CIA’s  assessment o f the o peratio ns  o f Japan’s  wartime intelligence services  was
at times  scathing: “techniques , training, cho ice o f perso nnel and security were po o r,” it co mmented, adding that “o ther types  o f
clandes tine o peratio ns  were o ften co nfused with po s itive o r co unter-intelligence gathering; military o r o ther po litical autho rities
o ften interfered and so metimes  there was  even subvers io n by undergro und secret so cieties ”. A particular target o f criticism was  the
incessant rivalry and mutual mis trus t which had exis ted between the Japanese wartime intelligence o rgans  o f vario us  sectio ns  o f the
armed fo rces , and between the intelligence gathering o peratio ns  o f the military and the Minis try o f Fo reign Affairs : “the clash o f
individual with individual, unit with unit, and service with service in the highly specialized wo rld o f secret o peratio ns  is  almo s t generic
to  the field; ho wever, the Japanese carried it to  extremes  undreamed o f in Wes tern natio ns ”.20
The “almo s t generic” pro blem o f inter-service rivalry in the wo rld o f secret o peratio ns  was  very familiar to  CIA o peratives  in Japan,
because the same pro blem also  plagued US intelligence o peratio ns  in Japan during the o ccupatio n era. The CIA had been created in
July 1947, but during the firs t years  o f its  exis tence, its  influence in Japan was  circumscribed by the presence o f a number o f o ther
US intelligence agencies , with who m its  relatio ns  were o ften fro s ty. In the early s tages  o f the o ccupatio n o f Japan, the mo s t
po werful intelligence o rganizatio ns  were the Allied Occupatio n Autho rity’s  Civil Intelligence Sectio n (CIS) and the US Army’s
intelligence sectio n, G2, with its  vario us  subo rdinate bo dies .
 
G2 was  headed by the irascible and vehemently anti-co mmunis t
Majo r General Charles  A. Willo ughby (1892-1972). Willo ughby, who
was  the so n o f a German father and American mo ther and who se
birth name was  Ado lf Tscheppe-Weidenbach, had mo ved to  America
at the age o f eighteen and beco me a naturalized US citizen. As
Takemae Eiji no tes , “fello w Occupatio naires  mo cked the General’s
s tiff Pruss ian bearing, referring to  him alternately as  ‘Sir Charles ’
and ‘Baro n vo n Willo ughby’… Regarded as  a martinet by his
subo rdinates  – he to o k a perverse pride in the epithet ‘Little Hitler’,
and even MacArthur dubbed him ‘my lo veable fascis t’ – the vo latile
Willo ughby no netheless  enjo yed the Supreme Co mmander’s  full
co nfidence”.21 Willo ughby respo nded to  his  critics  in kind, reserving
his  fierces t invective fo r the liberal press , who se jo urnalis ts  he
called “bas tards ” and “pen pro s titutes ”, and accused o f furnishing
“aid and co mfo rt to  the enemy”.22 Occupying a dual ro le as  head o f
intelligence bo th fo r US army fo rces  in Japan and fo r the US Far
Eas tern Co mmand, Willo ughby po ssessed intelligence and co unter-
intelligence po wers  that enco mpassed the entire Eas t As ian regio n. Jack Cano n’s  Z Unit, created in 1947, was  jus t o ne o f a large
number o f o rganizatio ns  thro ugh which he exercised tho se po wers .23
But after the es tablishment o f the CIA, and particularly after the o utbreak o f the Ko rean War, Willo ughby fo und himself having to
share his  turf with a gro wing number o f o ther US intelligence o rganizatio ns , and bo th he and his  superio r General Do uglas
MacArthur deeply resented the intrus io n.24 The CIA gained its  firs t s ignificant fo o tho ld in Japan in 1948  via the blandly named Office
o f Po licy Co o rdinatio n (OPC), a special unit created to  engage in psycho lo gical warfare o peratio ns , and the Agency’s  influence grew
rapidly after the Ko rean co nflict erupted in June 1950.25 In 1949, the firs t head o f the CIA, Ro sco e Hillenko etter, expressed
o ptimism that “we have finally reached a satis facto ry agreement with Willo ughby, and I ho pe that it will keep up”. 26  But the ho pe was
fo rlo rn. Relatio ns  between Willo ughby and the CIA remained tense fo r decades . Willo ughby was  irked by the po wer o f the CIA, but at
the same time lo nged to  be a part o f the actio n, and after his  departure fro m Japan in 1951 co ntinued to  bo mbard CIA Directo r Allen
Dulles  with o ffers  o f help and sugges tio ns  o n ho w the Agency co uld impro ve its  co o peratio n with the military: sugges tio ns  to  which
Dulles  replied in the to ne o f co urteo us  fo rbearance that bureaucrats  o ften reserve fo r tho se they deeply dis like.27 As  Willo ughby
explained to  Dulles  in 1961, “it was  quite clear to  me, based o n my effo rts  to  fit CIA into  the MacArthur co mmand s tructure in Japan,
that yo u will always  be in co llis io n, o vert o r co vert, with the [Armed] Services ”.28  Meanwhile, intelligence gathering was  also  being
carried o ut by a range o f o ther US gro ups  including the US Far Eas t Air Fo rces  (FEAF) and by several separate s ignals  intelligence
and co mmunicatio ns  units .29
Eventually, it was  the CIA that gained the upper hand in the s truggle fo r intelligence co ntro l. Immediately after MacArthur’s  dismissal
in April 1951, Willo ughby to o  returned to  the United States  in a s tate o f “nervo us  s lump”, handing o ver to  the CIA his  files , many o f
his  co ntacts  in Japan, and his  messages  o f co ncern abo ut the need to  co ntinue pro tecting and nurturing the fo rmer senio r Imperial
Army o fficers  who m he co ns idered “essential fo r rearmament”.30
To the Victors, the Spies: Intelligence and the Transwar Regime
T he Japanese surrender delegat io n o n it s way t o
t he Philippines - Kawabe in cent re
The making o f Japan’s  transwar regime began even befo re the fo rmal surrender was  s igned. On 19  to  20  Augus t 1945, a s ixteen-
perso n Japanese delegatio n traveled to  Manila to  nego tiate with
Do uglas  MacArthur, Charles  Willo ughby and o thers  abo ut the
trans fer o f po wer to  the inco ming o ccupatio n fo rces . The delegatio n
was  led by the Imperial Army’s  Deputy Chief o f Staff, Kawabe
To rashirō  (1890-1960). Meanwhile, the Imperial Army’s  chief o f
intelligence, Arisue Seizō  (1895-1992), who  o n 8  Augus t had been
the firs t senio r military o fficial sent to  Hiro shima to  inspect the
effects  o f the ato mic bo mbing, was  given the task o f preparing the
receptio n fo r MacArthur and his  s taff when they arrived at Atsugi
Airbase.31
Despite Arisue’s  firs t-hand experiences  in Hiro shima, his  attitude to
the victo rs , like Kawabe’s , was  so  welco ming that bo th men quickly
wo n the trus t o f the US co mmand. Charles  Willo ughby, an o utspo ken
admirer o f Benito  Musso lini32, may also  have been attracted to
Arisue by the fact that the fo rmer intelligence chief had o nce served
as  Japanese Military Attache in Ro me, where he had develo ped a
s imilar enthus iasm fo r Italian Fascism and repo rtedly attempted to
develo p a jo int Japanese-Italian s trategy to wards  the Mus lim wo rld.33
Rather than being inves tigated fo r war crimes , therefo re, Arisue was
“interro gated, then called in fo r co nsultatio n very early in the
o ccupatio n”, and “a wo rking relatio nship apparently develo ped”.34
Arisue was  so o n ins talled by Willo ughby in a sectio n o f G2’s
headquarters  in the NYK Building in central To kyo , where his
o s tens ible task was  to  co llect and analyze archives  and write mo no graphs  abo ut Japan’s  wartime activities . One advantage o f this
appo intment was  the o ppo rtunities  it pro vided, no t o nly to  unearth and preserve the archive o f Japan’s  military actio ns  in As ia, but
also  to  make parts  o f it disappear fro m the reco rd (so  co ntinuing a pro cess  which had begun with the des tructio n o f many
do cuments  during the las t days  o f the war). A US o fficial no te fro m May 1946  advises  that so me Japanese War Minis try do cuments
“o f a special nature” are absent fro m the catalo gue o f files  that had been drawn up, “having been left in the charge o f Arisue.”35
Arisue’s  new po s itio n o f trus t with the American fo rces  enabled him to  pro vide financial suppo rt to  Kawabe To rashirō , who  also
so o n became a key info rmant to  the o ccupatio n fo rces 36 ; and Arisue then pro ceeded to  recruit a number o f o ther leading fo rmer
military figures , including Hatto ri Takushirō , who  had held key po s itio ns  in the Imperial army general s taff, and later Tsuji Masano bu,
a wartime co lo nel and military s trategis t who  was  regarded as  o ne o f the architects  o f the invas io n o f Malaya and Singapo re, and
had go ne into  hiding during the early o ccupatio n era after being lis ted as  a Class  A war criminal.37 As  Willo ughby later wro te, these
peo ple had been “the brains ” o f the fo rmer Imperial Japanese general s taff: “mo no graphs  were jus t a co ver, to  keep them fro m
starving”.38  Equally impo rtantly, the research activities  o f Arisue, Kawabe, Hatto ri, Tsuji and o thers  enabled them to  beco me crucial
co nduits  o f info rmatio n fo r the US o ccupiers  – a ro le to  which they to o k with enthus iasm. They rapidly rees tablished their autho rity
o ver no w unemplo yed fo rmer military subo rdinates , creating a web o f private intelligence o rganizatio ns  which pro vided info rmatio n
to  the Americans  in return fo r a variety o f mo netary and o ther rewards . This  web, as  we shall see, extended acro ss  bo rders  into
many parts  o f the fo rmer Japanese empire.
Kawabe To rashirō  had no  previo us  intelligence backgro und, but, the CIA o bserved, “as  the las t active representative o f the Japanese
General Staff free to  act o n behalf o f the Army, he has  the autho rity to  o rder co o peratio n fro m such Japanese as  he might cho o se,
and he has  apparently cho sen well”.39  By 1948, Kawabe’s  private intelligence gathering o rganizatio n was  wo rking in clo se
co o peratio n with tho se o f Arisue and o thers , in a po werful co mbinatio n so metimes  kno wn as  the KATO Organizatio n ( Katō Kikan),
after the initials  o f its  fo ur co re ex-military leaders : Kawabe, Arisue, and fo rmer senio r military o fficers  Tanaka Ryūkichi and Ōikawa
Genshichi. The Katō  Kikan co o perated and co mpeted with a ho s t o f s imilar tho ugh less  po werful secret o r semi-secret
o rganizatio ns , many o f them created by fo rmer military o fficers . The pro cess  by which these gro ups  were fo rmed and re-fo rmed is
o utlined by the 1951 CIA repo rt o n the Japanese intelligence services : “An ‘expert’, co ntacted by an American agency, wo uld fo rm a
gro up o ut o f perso nnel kno wn to  him who  happened to  be available and willing. Often such gro ups  wo uld include no n-pro fess io nals .
Asso ciatio ns  in the undergro und became fluid as  they received the backing o f firs t o ne pro minent po litical and military figure and
then ano ther”.40  At leas t fo r part o f the o ccupatio n perio d, o rganizatio ns  like Kawabe’s  were largely (and co vertly) funded by US
autho rities .41
Alo ngs ide the purely info rmatio n gathering o rganizatio ns  were a number o f bus iness  ventures  which used co mmercial activities , and
o ften the smuggling o f go o ds  between Japan and o ther parts  o f As ia, bo th as  a co ver fo r intelligence activities  and a so urce o f
finance fo r o ther po litical o bjectives . One key figure in this  field was  fo rmer Maj. Gen. Watanabe Wataru, a clo se asso ciate o f
Arisue, who se Mitsubo shi Trading Co mpany co nducted smuggling and espio nage o peratio ns  into  China, Ko rea and Taiwan. 42 Ano ther
o perative, the prewar left-winger turned wartime intelligence agent Kawaguchi Tadaatsu, ran his  smuggling-cum-espio nage activities
via a co mpany delightfully named the Peace [Heiwa] Trus t Credit Co mpany. 43 These ventures  interacted with mo re o vertly criminal
enterprizes  run by underwo rld figures  like Ko dama Yo shio  (1911-1984). The links  between Ko dama, G2 and CIA have received
co ns iderable attentio n, but o thers  (as  we shall see) played an equally impo rtant ro le.44
Mo st o f the early o ccupatio n perio d Japanese military/intelligence o rganizatio ns  were To kyo -based, but there were exceptio ns , the
mo s t no table o f which was  a po werful o rganizatio n run by fo rmer Majo r General Hagi Saburō  in Ho kkaido : an area regarded as
particularly sens itive because o f its  pro ximity to  the So viet Unio n, the presence o f large numbers  o f repatriates  fro m the fo rmer
co lo ny o f Karafuto , and the left-wing tendencies  o f the is land’s  subs tantial mining co mmunities . Hagi had clo se links  to  Arisue
Seizō , and the latter (who  o riginally came fro m Bibai in Ho kkaido ) apparently “either influenced o r directed, in co njunctio n with
Kawabe To rashiro  and o ther fo rmer general o fficers , the co o peratio n in Ho kkaido  o f General Hagi’s  men with American Agencies
there”.45
The extent o f these gro ups ’ activities  can be co njectured by co ns idering a pro ject that was  perhaps  their mo s t ambitio us  deal with
the US o ccupiers : the Takematsu Plan, drawn up in 1948  and implemented in 1949. Under this  plan, US G2 emplo yed private
o rganizatio ns  run by Kawabe To rashirō  and his  fo rmer Imperial Army asso ciates  to  carry o ut a large-scale pro gram o f co vert
do mes tic and fo reign intelligence gathering thro ugho ut Japan and Eas t As ia. The plan had two  elements : Take (to  be dis cussed
further in part two  o f this  essay) invo lved Japanese espio nage agains t the So viet Unio n, China and No rth Ko rea; Matsu invo lved
do mes tic espio nage and co unter espio nage. All the wo rk was  to  be co nducted by Japanese, with funding and o verall supervis io n
pro vided by Willo ughby and o ther senio r G2 o fficers . Co l. R. G. Duff o f G2’s  co unterintelligence sectio n had direct supervis io n o f
Matsu, while Co l. Arthur L. Lacey supervized Take.
Ogat a T aket o ra
Under the Matsu Plan, Japan was  divided into  eight regio ns , and intelligence gathering in each area was  placed under the co ntro l o f
pro minent asso ciates  o f Kawabe. Sappo ro  was  ass igned to  Arisue Seizō ’s  friend Hagi Saburō , and To kyo  to  Tatsumi Eiichi, a prewar
military attache in Lo ndo n and wartime Chief o f Staff o f Japan’s  Eas tern Army, who  wo uld so o n beco me Prime Minis ter Yo shida
Shigeru’s  chief adviso r o n military matters . Espio nage agains t the So viet Unio n was  placed under the directio n o f Arisue Senzaburō ,
the bro ther o f Arisue Seizō . Kawabe drew up a detailed budget fo r these pro jects  which ran into  the tens  o f millio ns  o f yen. But the
scale o f the schemes , and the peo ple invo lved, aro used so me alarm ins ide the o ccupatio n fo rces . One US o fficial expressed
co ncerns  that Kawabe was  s imply demanding mo ney fo r activities  in which he and his  friends  were already engaged, and added, “very
frankly, I believe the o peratio n is  no  mo re than a high level shakedo wn”. Perhaps  fo r this  reaso n, elements  o f the plan were scaled
back: Matsu and sectio ns  o f Take went ahead, but o n a reduced scale.46  If no thing else, tho ugh, Matsu seems  at leas t to  have
generated plenty o f paperwo rk: o ne declass ified CIA do cument quo tes  “Matsu Repo rt No . 1091”, dated 10  Octo ber 1952 (well after
Willo ughby’s  departure fro m Japan and the end o f the US o ccupatio n).47
Within a co uple o f years  o f the s tart o f the o ccupatio n, then, a co mplex netwo rk had emerged, linking (in the CIA’s  wo rds ) “vas t
numbers  o f purged Rightis t po liticians , bus inessmen, fo rmer Army and Navy leaders , ex-diplo mats , secret so ciety members , po litical
pro pagandis ts  and lo bbyis ts , as  well as  many Liberal Party and go vernment o fficials  in clandes tine gro ups  and activities  bes t
described by the term ‘undergro und’ o peratio ns . They mingled with fo rmer intelligence pro fess io nals , with gangs ters , and with
perso ns  engaged fo r private pro fit in o ther types  o f clandes tine and illegal activities .”48
The US intelligence agencies , o f co urse, realized that their Japanese info rmants  were pursuing a varied and shifting agenda. So me
genuinely believed that US po wer was  vital to  preserve Japan fro m co mmunism; so me were s imply seeking to  make mo ney; many
were also  us ing intelligence activities  to  create a base fo r Japanese military revival. Mo s t, perhaps , pursued all three aims  at o nce.
Like the prewar imperial intelligence sys tem and the o ccupatio n autho rities ’ o wn info rmatio n gathering apparatuses , this  flo ating
wo rld o f po s twar Japanese intelligence was  riddled with factio nalism. Tho ugh alliances  were o ften fo rmed, bitter rivalries  develo ped
to o : no tably between Arisue and so me o f tho se he had recruited to  the o ccupatio n intelligence sys tem. No t surpris ingly, perhaps ,
the fo rmer military intelligence chief’s  co mfo rtable relatio nship with the victo rs  did no t endear him to  all his  fello w citizens . One
Japanese go vernment finance o fficial (who  was  also  pro viding info rmatio n to  the Americans) described Arisue as  “a very clever
turnco at, who  turned o ut as  part o f the welco ming co mmittee fo r General MacArthur, despite his  bitter anti-Allied attitude prio r to
and during the war”.49
As  the ho pes  o f fo rmer military o fficers  fo r rearmament grew with the es tablishment o f the quas i-military Natio nal Po lice Reserve in
1950, figures  like Hatto ri and Tsuji became increas ingly critical o f Arisue’s  dependence o n the US, and Arisue’s  gro wing iso latio n
dro ve him further into  US arms . By 1951, his  influence in the wo rld o f clandes tine intelligence gathering was  diminishing. Yet he
co ntinued to  maintain clo se co ntacts  with pro minent po liticians  including Kishi No busuke, and with them to  be engaged in lo bbying
the go vernment o n security and intelligence is sues , well into  the 1980s . In 1959, when the Kishi adminis tratio n was  engaged in
sens itive nego tiatio ns  o n the revis io n o f Security Treaty with the US, Arisue was  appo inted to  the po s itio n o f research o fficer by the
Japanese Fo reign Minis try and dispatched o n a wo rld to ur which included vis its  to  the US, Euro pe and the Middle Eas t50 ; and in
1986, when the Nakaso ne go vernment was  planning to  tighten anti-subvers io n laws , Arisue was  o ne o f the senio r members  o f the
Co nsultatio n Gro up o f Parliamentarians  and Experts  fo r the Pro mo tio n o f an Espio nage Preventio n Law [Supai Bōshi no tame no
Hōristu Seitei Sokushin Giin, Yūshikisha Kondankai], a key lo bby gro up suppo rting s tro nger co unter-subvers ive legis latio n, chaired by
Kishi.51
A Most Unusual Relationship
Meanwhile, the o ccupatio n fo rces  were also  cultivating relatio nships
with senio r figures  fro m Japan’s  wartime civilian intelligence
co mmunity, mo s t no tably with Ogata Taketo ra, the fo rmer Asahi
newspaper edito r who  had beco me the head o f the Japanese
go vernment’s  wartime Intelligence Bureau in 1944. Immediately after
Japan’s  surrender, Ogata was  called in by the o ccupatio n autho rities ,
who  so ught his  advice o n ques tio ns  o f media censo rship.52 He was
later inves tigated fo r war crimes  but never pro secuted, and in 1951
was  de-purged.53
After the end o f the o ccupatio n o f Japan, and as  the Ko rean War
entered its  final s tages , the Japanese intelligence sys tem was
gradually mo ving fro m reliance o n a ho s t o f private undergro und
agencies  to wards  a mo re fo rmalized and centralized s tructure with
clo ser links  to  the no w do minant CIA. One element in the
reo rganizatio n was  the creatio n in December 1950  o f a unit within
the Japanese Atto rney General’s  Special Inves tigatio n Bureau to
gather info rmatio n particularly o n members  o f the Japanese
Co mmunis t Party and suspected Ko rean co mmunis ts  in Japan. This
unit recruited its  s taff fro m the po lice fo rces , but co ntinued to  rely,
fo r so me time at leas t, o n info rmatio n fro m the vario us  private
intelligence o rganizatio ns  that had flo urished s ince the s tart o f the
o ccupatio n.54
Meanwhile, mo ves  to  create a centralized natio nal intelligence
agency were underway. Acco rding to  the memo irs  o f Jack Cano n’s
deputy Yeo n Jeo ng, so metime sho rtly befo re Cano n’s  departure fro m
Japan in 1952, Cano n and Yeo n were taken by Charles  Willo ughby to
a meeting with Prime Minis ter Yo shida. The Prime Minis ter asked
them to  make a call o n Ogata Taketo ra, who  was , he said, already
planning the creatio n o f a new Japanese intelligence agency. Z Unit’s
head and deputy head then had a meeting with Ogata in an o ffice
near the parliament building, and briefed him abo ut the wo rkings  o f
the US intelligence es tablishment.55
In Octo ber 1952, Ogata was  elected to  parliament and pro mptly appo inted Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Yo shida adminis tratio n, in
which ro le he embarked o n the pro cess  o f trying to  build a Japanese intelligence agency. Two  mo nths  later CIA Directo r Allen Dulles
traveled to  To kyo  where he met bo th Yo shida and Ogata to  dis cuss  a future Japanese intelligence o rganizatio n. During their
meeting, Ogata assured the CIA chief that the Japanese go vernment was  already receiving US help in this  field, but needed co ntinued
ass is tance and wo uld “co o perate fully” with the US in the intelligence field. Yo shida and Dulles  also  dis cussed a recent incident
who se details  remain censo red in the declass ified CIA files  even to day, but was  almo s t certainly the kidnapping o f Kaji by Z Unit, an
is sue which do minated the Japanese headlines  at the time.56
This  meeting was  the s tart o f so mething that the CIA was  to  reco gnize as  a highly “unusual relatio nship” with Ogata Taketo ra: “a
mo re willing co o perato r co uld hardly have been fo und”.57 Altho ugh Ogata did no t succeed in creating the large-scale intelligence
agency that he had ho ped fo r, he did set up a mo re mo des t s tate intelligence bo dy, the Cabinet Research Chamber [ Naikaku Sōridaijin
Kanbō Chōsashitsu; later renamed the Naikaku Chōsashitsu], who se firs t head, fo rmer Superintendent o f the Metro po litan Po lice Murai
Jun, had been a clo se friend o f Jack Cano n’s  during the days  o f Z Unit.58  (With the help o f such exalted po lice co nnectio ns , but
witho ut any legal bas is , senio r Z Unit o peratives  like Yeo n Jeo n had been secretly is sued with fo rmal Japanese po lice do cuments
ackno wledging their right to  carry o ut arres ts  o n Japanese so il59 ). Many o f the Cabinet Research Chamber’s  key advisers  were
fo rmer senio r imperial army o fficers , who  in the early days  o f the Chamber’s  o peratio ns  were repo rtedly selected o n the advice o f
Tatsumi Eiichi, fo rmer To kyo  head o f the secret Matsu Plan. 6 0  Ogata was  also  success ful in pro mo ting the creatio n o f a Japanese
no n-s tate bo dy, the Central Intelligence Co rpo ratio n [Chū ō Chōsa Sha], which was  s taffed primarily by leading figures  fro m the
Japanese media and wo rked o n a co ntract bas is  to  supply info rmatio n to  the go vernment. The Co rpo ratio n’s  headquarters  was  in
the o ffices  o f the Jiji News  Agency, and its  bo ard members  included senio r figures  fro m Kyō dō  News  Agency, Jiji, and the fo rmer
wartime News  Agency Dō mei.6 1
In 1955, Ogata – no w the leading candidate fo r the future prime minis tership o f Japan – was  o fficially enro lled as  a high-level CIA
info rmant under the co dename POCAPON. So o n he was , amo ngs t o ther things , supplying the Agency with damaging info rmatio n
abo ut his  Japanese co nservative po litical rivals , including Hato yama Ichirō  and Kō no  Ichirō , bo th o f who m he evidently lo athed.6 2 He
also  o ffered his  CIA handler mo re general assessments  o f the po litical s ituatio n in Japan, including an express io n o f his  co nfidence
that the Japanese public co uld readily be persuaded o f the need fo r a military buildup: “He [Ogata] said that Japanese public o pinio n
is  easy to  sway o ne o r ano ther and if they had a few brass  bands  parading up and do wn the co untry, exhibiting sho ws  o f s trength,
and the like the Japanese who  are no w clamo uring fo r peace will so o n quiet do wn”.6 3
In return, Ogata received Chris tmas  presents  fro m the CIA6 4, and a lo an to  help his  so n co mplete his  univers ity s tudies  in the US6 5,
and (as  we shall see) he perso nally to o k perso nal charge o f funds  that the CIA was  secretly channeling to  Japan’s  Cabinet Research
Chamber; but his  real mo tivatio n seems  to  have been po litical rather than financial. The truly valuable thing that Ogata received
fro m the CIA was  info rmatio n, including sens itive US intelligence do cuments  which he co uld use in the intense po wer s truggles  which
surro unded the fo rmatio n o f the nascent Liberal Demo cratic Party in No vember 1955. This  relatio nship was  eventually, fro m the
CIA’s  po int o f view, to  pro ve so mething o f a liability. In January 1956  Ogata, having jus t lo s t the po wer s truggle fo r leadership o f the
new ruling party, suddenly died o f a heart attack. Urgent effo rts  were needed to  retrieve the CIA do cuments  which had been secretly
handed to  Ogata befo re his  death. These effo rts  pro ved o nly partly success ful: so me impo rtant do cuments  were never fo und, and
the agent respo ns ible fo r reco vering them had to  co nso le his  superio rs  with the sugges tio n that they had pro bably “been
inadvertently burnt as  part o f kindling material fo r his  [Ogata’s ] ofuro (bath) at ho me”.6 6
Ogata was  no t the o nly senio r Japanese po litician to  be fo rmally appro ved as  a CIA co ntact. Fo llo wing Ogata’s  sudden death, the
Agency received info rmatio n fro m To kyo  po inting to  Kaya Okino ri, who  had served as  Japan’s  wartime finance minis ter and been
sentenced to  life impriso nment at the To kyo  War Crimes  trials  but was  subsequently released, as  a po ss ible future Japanese prime
minis terial candidate.6 7 Altho ugh Kaya never became prime minis ter, he was  a very clo se asso ciate o f Kishi No busuke, with who m he
had been impriso ned in Sugamo . Fo llo wing Kishi’s  elevatio n to  the po s itio n o f prime minis ter, Kaya was  elected to  parliament in
1958, and in January o f the fo llo wing year he traveled to  Washingto n with a letter o f perso nal intro ductio n fro m fo rmer Prime
Minis ter Yo shida to  CIA Directo r Dulles . In a meeting with Dulles  and senio r State Department figures , Kaya presented a ro us ing
disquis itio n o n the dangers  o f the “co mmunizatio n o f co untries ”, including Japan, and appealed to  the CIA to  be mo re active in
making US po licies  unders to o d by the Japanese peo ple.6 8
After this  meeting, the CIA es tablished a regular relatio nship with Kaya, who m they co denamed POSONNET-1, and a To kyo  based
agent met regularly with the po litician to  exchange info rmatio n.6 9  When Kaya became Chair o f the LDP’s  Fo reign Affairs  Co mmittee
in Augus t o f the same year, in the lead-up to  the revis io n o f the Japan-US Security Treaty, he pro mptly co ntacted Dulles  again,
appealing to  the sense o f co mmo n interes ts  es tablished at their Washingto n meeting: “I kno w yo u will aid me whenever it lies  in
yo ur po wer to  do  so ”.70  But the relatio nship did no t flo urish as  the special co nnectio n with Ogata had. Kaya’s  CIA handler became
frus trated at his  tendency to  speak in grand po litical generalities  rather than pro viding co ncrete info rmatio n, and the CIA’s
co nnectio n to  Kaya lapsed fo r a while.
By 1965, tho ugh, Kaya, no w Chair o f the Liberal Demo cratic Party’s  Po licy Bo ard, had again beco me invo lved in vario us  (unspecified)
co vert CIA activities ,71 and o fficial permiss io n was  granted to  the To kyo  CIA Chief o f Statio n to  use Kaya “as  a so urce o f
info rmatio n o n develo pments  o n the po litical s cene and to  ass is t in the co nduct o f specific MHSPAWN [CIA co de wo rd fo r co vert
pro paganda] activities ”.72 The co nnectio n las ted at leas t until 1968 , when crucial electio ns  were being held in Okinawa (then s till
under US co ntro l but so o n to  be returned to  Japanese rule, while US military bases  remained in place). A CIA no te fro m 15
September 1968  reads  in part: “POSONNET/1 - A fo rmer cabinet minis ter and currently Prime Minis ter Sato ’s  chief rightwing LDP
adviso r, this  co ntact is  amenable to  jo int CA [co vert actio n] directed agains t the Okinawa electio ns . Co ntact with him is  maintained
fo r this  purpo se…”73
Other key figures  in the prewar, wartime and po s twar Japanese po litical s cene were also  o n the CIA’s  bo o ks  as  info rmants  and
co llabo rato rs  in pro paganda o peratio ns . Tatsumi Eiichi, the prewar Japanese military attache in Lo ndo n, who  in the po s twar years
advised Prime Minis ter Yo shida o n such is sues  as  the appo intment o f fo rmer wartime Japanese military o fficers  to  the Natio nal
Po lice Reserve, was  also  o n the CIA’s  bo o ks  under the co dename POLESTAR-1. His  interes ting career is  dis cussed in mo re detail in
part two  o f this  essay.74 Shō riki Matsutarō , o wner o f the Yomiuri Newspaper, was  elected to  parliament in 1955, beco ming head o f
the Ho kkaidō  Develo pment Agency under the Hato yama Adminis tratio n, and head o f the State Security Co mmittee [Kokka Kōan Iinkai],
the Science and Techno lo gy Agency and Japan’s  Nuclear Po wer Co mmiss io n under Prime Minis ter Kishi. He to o  was  an o fficially
regis tered CIA co ntact, kno wn by the co de-names  PODAM and POJACKPOT-1, and was  co vertly used by the Agency to  dis seminate
pro -US and pro -nuclear energy info rmatio n in Japan and o ther co untries , beco ming the mo s t pro minent and vo cal pro mo ter o f
nuclear po wer in Japan.75
Exploiting the Repatriates: The Cross-Border Dimensions of the Transwar Regime
These examples  o f the intertwined relatio nships  linking fo rmer Japanese intelligence o fficers , fo rmer Imperial military and fo rmer
members  o f the wartime military go vernment to  US intelligence agencies  and po s twar Japanese go vernments  are jus t a fractio n o f
the relatio nships  detailed in the declass ified CIA do cuments 76 , and these in turn are no t the who le s to ry.77 The examples  given here,
tho ugh, help to  sketch the o utlines  o f that s to ry. It is  a his to ry o f the way in which military and go vernment figures  fro m Japan’s
wartime adminis tratio n, who  were believed to  po ssess  valuable info rmatio n o r intelligence-gathering skills , were reinco rpo rated
Japanese POWs in Siberia
into  the po s twar o rder at the behes t o f the US o ccupiers . These individuals  then became part o f an extens ive netwo rk o f clandes tine
o r semi-clandes tine info rmatio n o rganizatio ns  in early Co ld War Japan, in many cases  beco ming deeply embedded, o n the o ne hand,
with the po s twar Japanese po litical elite and, o n the o ther, with US intelligence services .
Of co urse, the security threats  which were used to  jus tify the need fo r co vert actio n were no t imaginary. The So viet Unio n, China and
No rth Ko rea were all undo ubtedly engaged in espio nage in Japan, and there were left-wing Japanese citizens  (tho ugh no t very many)
who  genuinely so ught to  advance the cause o f armed revo lutio n. But co vert actio n linked bo th to  the wartime Japanese regime and
to  the US intelligence co mmunity became, thro ugh the pro cesses  sketched here, embedded at the co re o f the Japanese po litical
es tablishment in extrao rdinarily far-reaching ways  that have had las ting co nsequences . When so me o f the mo s t senio r figures  in the
ruling party o f any demo cracy is  fo und to  have been engaged in a pro ject with a fo reign intelligence service to  influence the co urse
o f an electio n by co vert means , it is  clear that the wild zo ne o f po wer is  leaking into  demo cratic life to  a dis turbing degree. And this
became all the mo re dis turbing when (as  o ccurred in 2007 in the case o f the Kaya s to ry) the release o f o fficial do cuments  revealing
this  co vert agreement is  met with almo s t to tal s ilence and indifference fro m the natio nal media o f the co untry co ncerned.78
The creatio n o f the transwar regime was  impo rtant, tho ugh, no t o nly because o f its  do mes tic co nsequences , but also  because o f the
ways  in which it linked Japan into  a web o f cro ss -bo rder activities  that also  affected the Co ld War his to ry o f the regio n mo re widely.
One crucial facto r that made Japan a no de in internatio nal intelligence gathering was  the mass  repatriatio n o f Japanese so ldiers  and
civilians  fro m the lo s t empire and fro m priso n camps  in the So viet Unio n and China.
The US viewed Japanese returning fro m the So viet Unio n and China
bo th as  vital so urces  o f info rmatio n o n co mmunis t co untries  and as
po tential so urces  o f subvers io n. Indeed, as  Matthew Aid po ints  o ut,
during the Ko rean War the US Far Eas tern Co mmand (FECOM) derived
mo s t o f its  info rmatio n abo ut So viet military activities  fro m
the interro gatio n o f almo s t 1.5 millio n Japanese priso ners
o f war who  had returned fro m captivity in the So viet Unio n o r
So viet-co ntro lled areas  in the Far Eas t between the end o f
the Seco nd Wo rld War and June 1950. Between December
1946  and June 1948, the FECOM Central Interro gatio n Centre
in To kyo  had screened almo s t 625,000  Japanese
repatriates , briefly interro gated 57,000  fo rmer Japanese
POWs at their po rt o f entry, and mo re extens ively
interro gated 9 ,000  fo rmer POWs in To kyo  who  po ssessed
‘s ignificant intelligence info rmatio n abo ut the So viet Unio n.79
This  mass ive task o f info rmatio n co llectio n and analys is  required the invo lvement o f many o rganizatio ns  and individuals , bo th US
and Japanese. Very early o n, Arisue Seizō  and his  fello w researchers  in the NYK Building were put to  wo rk by G2 analys ing reco rds  o f
the interro gatio ns  o f the repatriates ,8 0  and Z Unit to o  was  invo lved in the same task (us ing techniques  which will be dis cussed in
mo re detail in part two ).8 1 The secret co llabo ratio n in this  pro cess  co ntinued lo ng after the end o f the o ccupatio n. In September
1955, sho rtly after the es tablishment o f the new Cabinet Research Chamber, the CIA reached agreement with Ogata Taketo ra and
Fo reign Minis ter Okazaki Katsuo  o n a “to p secret plan fo r the explo itatio n o f repatriates ”, aimed mainly at Japanese who  were
expected to  return fro m China to  Japan in the near future. The wo rk was  to  be do ne by Japan’s  Cabinet Research Chamber with the
help o f the Japanese po lice, but the info rmatio n was  to  be passed to  the US Department o f State. A few days  later, the CIA appro ved
a lo an o f US$39,458 .34 fo r the repatriate intelligence screening pro ject, which was  to  be handed to  Ogata in perso n.8 2
His to rian Lo ri Watt has  detailed the suspicio n and s tigma that repatriates  fro m the So viet Unio n faced when they arrived ho me,
o ften after terrible experiences  in captivity in Siberia: “to  be a So viet detainee was  to  be suspected o f co mmunism”.8 3 But fo r so me
returnees  inscriptio n into  the sys tem o f po s twar US-Japan intelligence co llabo ratio n was  to  have even mo re dras tic and far reaching
co nsequences ; and the explo itatio n o f the repatriated Japanese in turn became jus t part o f a much wider his to ry o f transbo rder
clandes tine activities  spanning the breadth o f Co ld War Eas t As ia: a his to ry that we will explo re in part two  o f this  essay.
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